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African economies have experienced weak levels of growth
in per capita income over the past decade.  While standard
models of growth suggest that institutional governance as
one key to success, thus far little attention has been given to
the role of risk in institutional reform.  In this paper, we use
a nested panel regression model to estimate the economic
value of institutional reform on economic growth, with data
for 30 Sub-Saharan African countries over the 1980-2004
time period. Our findings provide a basis for measuring the
economic value of institutional reform through its impact
on reducing aggregate country risk.
Managing Risk in Africa through Institutional Reform
By almost any measure, African countries thus far have enjoyed limited benefits from
the expansion of globalization in the last few decades1. With relatively open economies,
many have undertaken major structural reforms that have shifted emphasis from public to
private market forces.  As they have done so, debt service ratios have fallen to among the
lowest among developing country regions. Yet, despite these reforms, the results have
been disappointing: real per capita GDP has grown at less than one percent per year, and
Africa’s per capita GDP has fallen from just under a third to little over a fifth of the world
average2. In this paper, we explore the role of aggregate risk as a major factor in shaping
Africa's development prospects, and how institutional innovation is a necessary step to
achieve sustainable economic growth.
Institutional Models of Growth and Development
For some time, research on developing and newly emerging market economies has
been driven by estimating required investment levels to achieve sustainable economic
growth.  If domestic rates of saving or trade have been insufficient, international aid
would fill in the gap. However, while studies such as Sachs (2005), and Burnside and
Dollar (2000) suggest that aid can be effective, Easterly (2006, 2003, 2001), Barro
(1997), and Rajan (2006a, 2006b) provide evidence that aid has been counterproductive.
As the debate on international aid has unfolded (Kanbur, 2000), it has led in turn to a
more critical view of the role of traditional economic reform, be that international trade,
foreign direct investment, or privatization3. Shirley (2005) finds that aid can redirect
economic reform, but efforts thus far have produced limited results, due in no small part
for the neglect of property rights in crafting institutional design. In turn, Zagha, Nankani,
and Gill (2006) find that financial stability is a key ingredient in successful economic
reform, thus highlighting the importance of governance in achieving economic efficiency.
If the efficiency of investment varies widely across countries and over time,
governance is a key factor in explaining variations. Research on governance is broad, but
embraces a number of themes, including the importance of political stability, corruption,
democracy, and property rights, for example.   Bates (2005, 2004, 2001), Collier (1999),
and Herbst (2000) have examined the role of political stability in achieving economic
growth and find a direct relationship.  In turn, Olken (2005), Fisman and Gatti (2002),
Mauro (1995), and Shleifer (1993) have examined the impact of corruption on economic
efficiency.  While corruption is difficult to measure, the Corruption Perceptions Index,
which monitors perceptions through direct interviews, has made it possible to examine
the effects of corruption in a variety of countries4.  Moreover, as noted in Englebert
(2001), corruption undermines the legitimacy of states to maintain even the most basic
levels of security.
Democracy is yet another element in affecting economic growth.  It informs not just
the level and direction of many public international aid programs but also shapes standard
programs of economic reform.  Boko (2002), Collier (1999a, 1999b), Knack and Keefer
(1995), and Deng and Lyons (1998) find evidence that democracy is associated with
transparency and good governance.  However, the economic impact is less clear, as Barro
(1997) argued in his review of the determinants of economic growth.  Our view is that
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once risk is taken into consideration, the role of democracy is positive, but not as strong
as other determinants, particularly economic freedom.
Economic freedom in general, and property rights in particular, play a critical role in
institutional governance5. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), Ensminger (1997),
Fafchamps (1996), Bruce (1994), Place and Hazell (1993), provide evidence of the
impact of property rights on economic growth, drawing on the institutional framework
put forth in Williamson (1998), and North (1991).  What these studies do not measure,
however, is how economic freedom, and such determinants as property rights reduce the
level of risk, and in so doing, increase the level of per capita income.  Indeed, it is
precisely the absence of risk management institutions that lies at the center of such
diverse critiques as those of Stiglitz (2003), and DeSoto (2000).
Factoring Risk in Economic Growth
Risk pervades all economic transactions.  While financial markets work to incorporate
risk in the pricing of contracts, for some types of risk, no contracting mechanism exists6.
Moreover, even where financial markets do exist to incorporate risk, contract prices may
be inefficient due to market imperfections. For many developing countries, the absence or
imperfect market problem results in aggregate uncertainty, often with adverse effects on
the levels and efficiency of investment, trade, and general economic performance.  In our
view, sustainable development thus depends not just on market institutions, but how
institutional design permits a more efficient management of risk.
If risk is neglected in many studies, it is that in the absence of complete markets, it is
not readily observable.  Moreover, there are many kinds of risk that need to be
considered, namely, economic risk, financial risk, political risk, and environmental risk7.
In a fully functioning economic framework, these types of risk could be incorporated in
various contracting mechanisms as premia on transactions.
We consider first, therefore, the extent to which risk has been addressed in the
globalization and development literature, and then offer our own formulation as to how it
can be incorporated in a quantitative model.  From this we provide estimates of the
impact of institutional reform on the level of aggregate country risk.  In so doing, we
provide a way of assessing the economic value of such reform, using a panel of 30
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa listed in Appendix A.
Research on risk has focused largely on financial markets. Fafchamps, Udry, and
Dzukas (1998) look at the precautionary motive as affecting livestock herds as a buffer
against drought in West Africa.  Grimard (1997) points to the role of ethnic ties in
affecting household consumption smoothing patterns in Côte d'Ivoire, and Ngassam
(1992) examines monitoring costs on the selection of optimal financial contracts in that
country as well.
Environmental risk arises from air, soil, and water quality effects of economic activity.
In fully functioning markets, agents acquire insurance to protect against these risks, but in
some cases, institutions do not provide such coverage, or the institutions do not exist.  As
such, we do not have a separable measure of the effects of environmental risk on
economic growth, even though its presence may be significant.
Ideally, we would use complementary indices on political, economic, and
environmental risk to estimate their respective effects on economic growth.  Absent such
data, we propose the use of a proxy measure, namely, and index of aggregate country risk
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prepared by the International Country Risk Group and as reported periodically by the
World Bank8.  To our knowledge, this index thus far has not been used in the context of
institutional reform, but for which we derive useful findings in the context of Africa's
economic growth prospects.
Estimating the Role of Risk in Growth
To examine the role of risk in economic growth, we use panel regression analysis.
Panel regression models take the following general form:
€ 
Yit =α + βXit +ε it , for i = 1, 2,…,N, and t=1, 2, ….,T,  (1.)
where N is the number of cross-section units and T is the number of time periods.
Because there often are aggregation problems within panels, we do not use a pooled
regression model.  Instead, we rely either on an ordinary panel regression estimate, or on
a fixed effects panel regression model.  In a fixed effects model, dummy variables enable
the intercept term to vary over time and over cross-section units.  For a fixed effects
model, we write:
€ 
Yit =α + βXit + γ 2W2t + γ 3W3t + ...+ γ nWnt +δ2Zi2 +δ3Zi3 + ...+δT ZiT +ε it.,              (2.)
where:
€ 
Wit = 0  otherwise
1   for the ith individual, i = 2,....,N{
Zit = 0  otherwise
1   for the ith time period, i = 2,....,N{
Table 1
Sub-Saharan Africa Basic Growth Regressions
Dependent Variable:  PPP Real GDP Per Capita
Constant 1 6 0 8 . 8 4 2 1 8 9 7 . 4 9 1 1 6 1 2 . 9 1 5 1 6 0 4 . 8 9 3 1 6 0 7 . 0 9 8 1 8 6 1 . 1 2 5
GNSGDP 7 . 6 5 6 4 . 9 5 1 7 . 3 6 3 7 . 3 1 0 6 . 8 6 3 5 . 2 4 4
(10.758) (6.269) (10.430) (10.050) (9.328) (6.739)
TRDEP 2 . 4 4 3 1 . 9 8 8 2 . 2 2 6 2 . 4 9 9 2 . 4 0 4 1 . 9 1 1
(8.572) (5.614) (7.728) (8.552) (7.870) (5.230)
MKTCAPRATE 1 . 0 8 0 0 . 7 3 6 0 . 8 5 5
(1.761) (1.182) (1.3480)
FDIGDP 3 . 4 4 8 3 . 7 7 3 2 . 4 4 1
(2.697) (2.750) (1.455)
RCCRISK - 4 . 9 2 3 - 4 . 4 0 7
(6.893) (6.033)
Number of Observations 750 750 750 750 750 750
Adj. R-Sq. 0.9650 0.9702 0.9622 0.9643 0.9584 0.9702
F 667.85 764.32 597.21 632.62 524.41 718.01
Notes:
1. Panel regression estimates are based fixed effects using cross-section weights.
2. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
As a first approximation, using a panel of 30 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, we
report simple growth regressions including and excluding the ICRG index of aggregate
country risk for the 1980-2004period in Table 1.  Independent variables used are: the
national saving rate (GNSGDP); the level of trade dependency (TRDEP); the market
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capitalization ratio (MKTCAPRATE); the foreign direct investment ratio (FDIGDP); and
the index of aggregate country risk (RCCRISK). Definitions and sources used are listed
in Appendix A.
Determinants of Aggregate Country Risk
As the estimates in Table 1 illustrate, per capita real GDP is higher when risk is taken
into account, suggesting that how countries manage its level can have significant
consequences.  If risk is a significant factor in per capita GDP, we now develop a model
to examine its determinants.  To do so, we use Development Indicators from the World
Bank, along with data from the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, data
on political rights and civil liberties from Freedom House, and cross-section information
pertaining to contract formation from the World Bank’s African Development Indicators.
When it comes to institutional variables, quantitative indices are inevitably synthetic
ones.  For this reason, we draw on a variety of sources for the ones we use in our present
analysis.
Table 2
Determinants of Aggregate Country Risk
Dependent Variable:  RCCRISK (Revised Country Composite Risk Index)
Constant 43.873 33.116 40.470 44.597 50.609
AIDGNI 0.188 0.173 0.196 0.165 0.170
(6.195) (5.781) (7.513) (6.612) (6.431)
CORRUPA 1.527 1.033 1.185 0.867
(5.345) (4.028) (4.639) (3.040)






Number of Observations 750 750 750 750 750
Adj. R-Sq. 0.8691 0.8386 0.8916 0.8868 0.8389
F 4973.18 1947.34 2053.90 1468.00 781.15
Notes:
1. Panel regression estimates are based on cross-section weights, no effects specified.
2. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
As a first approximation, we derive panel estimates of the determinants of aggregate
country risk, the results for which are presented in Table 2.  As noted in our review, aid is
seen as playing a negative role on per capita GDP.  Our findings here point to aid as
increasing risk, which in turn reduces per capita GDP9. Our purpose here is not to focus
on the role of aid per se, but to note that in our expanded model, we focus on the negative
impact that it has on aggregate country risk.  This suggests that when aid is provided it
often serves other purposes beyond those at the center of our study, namely its negative
effect on real per capita GDP.  This finding also is consistent with the notion that
weakness in local financial institutions, and the corresponding levels of risk that this
weakness may produce, is a central element in understanding Africa’s growth dynamics
and the importance of the choice of financial institutions in achieving sustainable
economic growth.  In contrast, we note from Table 2 that democracy, economic freedom,
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and judicial independence can reduce aggregate country risk, and these institutional
variables form the focus of our nested panel model.
A Nested Regression Model of Risk-Based Growth
To sort out the roles of the various institutional variables reported in Table 2, we apply
Granger causality tests to establish a hierarchy that can be used in an expanded model of
growth.  A schematic of this hierarchy is shown in Figure 1.  For each variable, we list
the Granger null and the associated probability.  To capture the different ways that risk
plays a role, we apply separate Granger tests on key variables used in Tables 1 and 2, and
in turn note the hierarchy of determinants that shape the level of aggregate country risk.
Figure 1
Risk Model Structure
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Based on our Granger causality tests, we now generate predicted values, first for the
level of democracy and then for economic freedom.  In turn, we use these predicted
values in a nested panel regression to estimate the level of judicial independence and the
level of market capitalization.  The predicted value of judicial independence is then used
to derive an estimate of the level of corruption.  This predicted level of corruption is then
used along with the international aid ratio to derive the estimated level of aggregate
country risk.  The predicted level of risk is then used to derive predicted values for the
saving ratio, the level of trade dependency, and the foreign direct investment ratio.
Finally, these are used to derive the predicted level of per capita GDP.
Using the foregoing framework, our estimating equations can now be expressed as:
ECFREE = f(PROPRT) (3.)
DEMOC = f(CIVLIBS, POLRTS) (4.)
JUDIND = f(DEMOC*, ECFREE*) (5.)
CORRUPA = f (JUDIND*) (6.)
AIDGNI = f(DEBTSRAT, MILBURD) (7.)
RCCRISK = f(AIDGNI*, CORRUPA*) (8.)
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FDIGDP = f(RCCRISK*) (9.)
TRDEP = f(RCCRISK*) (10.)
GNSGDP = f(RCCRISK*) (11.)
MKTCAPRATE = f(ECFREE*) (12.)
PPPRPCGDP = f(GNSGDP*, TRDEP*, MKTCAPRATE*, FDIGDP*) (13.)
where estimated variable values are marked by an asterisk.
Results for these estimating equations are shown in Table 3. As predicted,
institutional variables have a significant influence on the level of per capita GDP.
Strengthening democracy through greater civil liberties and political rights has a positive
effect on judicial independence.  In turn, greater judicial independence reduces the level
of corruption, and lower corruption reduces in turn the level of aggregate country risk.
At the same time, strengthening property rights expands the level of economic freedom.
Greater economic freedom also increases judicial independence and the same direction of
effects as democracy.
Economic freedom also has a positive effect on the level of market capitalization.
Together, reduced aggregate country risk has a positive effect on a country’s saving rate
and its trade dependence, which together increase the level of per capita GDP.  However,
we note that economic freedom has a stronger effect than democracy on increasing the
level of judicial independence.  This finding is consistent with research by Barro (1997)
and Zakaria (2004), namely, that while democracy has a positive effect on per capita




Dependent Variable: DEMOC 3 . ECFREE 3 . JUDIND 4 . CORRUPA 4 . AIDGNI 6 . RCCRISK 4 . GNSGDP 7 . TRDEP 3 . MKTCAPRATE 9 . FDIGDP 8 . PPPRPCGDP 4 .
CONSTANT - 8 . 1 7 3 1 . 2 4 5 2 . 7 6 9 7 . 9 1 8 1 1 . 4 8 2 2 1 . 7 0 1 5 7 7 . 8 0 6 1 3 3 . 2 0 3 1 1 . 2 6 2 1 7 1 . 3 0 0 - 1 6 6 2 . 8 5 6
CIVLIBS 2 . 7 3 0
(42.534)
POLRTS 3 . 7 3 7
(67.292)
PROPRT 0 . 1 0 6
(7.142)
DEMOC* 0 . 0 2 5
(10.675)
ECFREE* 0 . 9 7 9 0 . 4 4 8
(15.225) (3.480)
JUDIND* - 0 . 1 3 8
(3.168)
MILBURD - 1 . 1 2 4
(6.134)
DEBTSRAT 0 . 1 1 4
(6.137)
AIDGNI* 0 . 3 1 4
(8.041)
CORRUPA* 2 . 9 0 3
(8.465)
RCCRISK* - 1 2 . 2 3 4 - 1 . 6 7 0 - 3 . 6 7 5
(3.225) (2.818) (5.474)
GNSGDP* 1 4 1 . 7 4 7
(15.120)
TRDEP* 1 6 . 0 2 1
(14.388)
MKTCAPRATE* 5 2 . 7 4 5
(53.057)
FDIGDP* 3 . 2 0 9
(6.842)
Number of Observations 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750
Adj. R-Sq. 0.9830 0.9701 0.9336 0.9789 0.7229 0.8402 0.4769 0.8020 0.8932 0.8130 0.8998
F 1395.21 810.92 5267.19 34796.17 64.04 196.24 98.89 357.25 2243.20
Notes:
1. T-statistics are reported in parentheses
2. Starred variables are based on predicted values from a nested regression.
3.  Estimate based on fixed effects using cross-section weights
4.  Estimate based on no effects with cross-section weights.
5.  Estimate based on two-stage least squares with cross-section weights and fixed effects.
6.  Estimate based on fixed cross-section specification with period GLS weights.
7.  Estimate based on two-stage least squares with rccrisk instrument, fixed cross-section specification with cross-section GLS weights.
8.  Estimate based on two-stage least squares, with fixed effects and cross-section weights, d(RCCRISK) as instrument.
9. Estimate based on two-stage least squares with ecfree(-1) as instrument, fixed cross-section and cross-section GLS weights.
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Estimating the Economic Value of Institutional Reform
If institutions are important to the determination of per capita income, it is useful to
ask what effect derives from an increase in their role.  Here we examine the separate and
joint effects of one-point changes in institutional variables on per capita GDP.  We do so
by a re-estimation of each of the determinants in the regression estimates listed in Table
3.  We summarize these impacts below in Table 4.
Table 4














Base Case $1,617.17 4.65% 8.55%
AIGDNI+1 $1,005.19 -$611.98 -37.84% -$13,164.67 -$7,161.05
DEBTSRAT+1 $1,547.47 -$69.70 -4.31% -$1,499.42 -$815.62
TRDEP+1 $1,633.19 $16.02 0.99% $344.54 $187.42
DEMOC+1 $1,636.54 $19.37 1.20% $416.61 $226.62
FDIGDP+1 $1,668.59 $51.42 3.18% $1,106.05 $601.65
MKTCAPRATE+1 $1,669.92 $52.75 3.26% $1,134.66 $617.21
CIVLIBS+1 $1,670.05 $52.88 3.27% $1,137.46 $618.73
DEBTSRAT-1 $1,686.88 $69.71 4.31% $1,499.49 $815.66
POLRTS+1 $1,689.56 $72.39 4.48% $1,557.15 $847.02
PROPRT+1 $1,700.55 $83.38 5.16% $1,793.56 $975.62
GNSGDP+1 $1,758.92 $141.75 8.77% $3,049.18 $1,658.63
JUDIND+1 $2,399.64 $782.47 48.38% $16,832.02 $9,155.94
ECFREE+1 $2,406.96 $789.79 48.84% $16,989.48 $9,241.59
RCCRISK-1 $3,567.05 $1,949.88 120.57% $41,944.74 $22,816.25
CORRUPA-1 $7,278.24 $5,661.07 350.06% $121,777.94 $66,242.30
       Present Value effects are computed using, respectively, mean and median levels of sample real interest rates.
When we examine the separate and joint effects of changes in policy variables, we
can determine the absolute and relative one-year changes in real per capita GDP.  In
addition, by using the sample mean and sample median real interest rate, we can compute
the present value of the changes in real per capita GDP.  In turn, the present value
estimates provide a framework for deciding how much a country should consider in
investing in strengthening various institutional variables relative to the impact on real per
capita GDP.
As can be seen in Table 4, increases in international aid and a country’s debt service
ratio reduce real per capita GDP.  In contrast, measures to increase a country’s saving
rate and trade dependency produce positive effects, but these measures produce smaller
gains than increasing a country’s level of economic freedom, the level of judicial
independence, and in reducing the level aggregate country risk, and corruption.
Within the context of our model, it also is useful to examine the separate effects of
individual determinants.  While an increase in civil liberties and political rights produce
gains in per capita income, when subsumed within our democracy variable, the net effect
is more modest.  In contrast, property rights, which are an important determinant of
economic freedom, produce large separate effects than democracy as a whole, which
suggests that the gains in per capita income from economic freedom are larger than those
for democracy as a whole10. While the largest gains in real per capita GDP are found
through reductions in aggregate country risk (RCCRISK) and in the level of corruption
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(CORRUPA), what our nested model provides is a sequential set of reforms that could
bring about these gains, notably, changes in such measures as the level civil liberties,
political rights, judicial independence, which in turn provide gains in democracy and
economic freedom that result in reductions in risk and corruption.
Our model points to the negative effect of international aid on real per capita GDP.
While we see it as contributing to aggregate country risk, we have not pursued a more
detailed analysis of its separate effects on the various determinants of income, Since
some (e.g. Sachs, 2005), have argued for an increase in international aid to help to lowest
income countries in Africa in such strategic areas as health, we do not rule out the
possibility that aid could play such a role.  However, as long as international aid
continues to serve larger political objectives, we remain skeptical as to its constructive
role in raising levels of per capita income.
Application of the Risk Model to Africa Sub-Group Configurations
Beyond the application of the risk model to our initial sample of 30 African countries,
we also undertook separate estimates of the various effects on regional community
groupings.  We first did separate regression estimates for sub-samples of Francophone
and Anglophone African countries.  We then did further estimates for four regional
economic groupings, namely, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA), for the West African Economic Community (ECOWAS), for the Southern
Africa Development community (SADC), and for the Central African Economic Union
(UDEAC).  We note that since we have used membership only for our sample of
countries rather than resampling for complete membership in these configurations, our
estimates should be interpreted as indicative rather than comprehensive11.
Results of our regional configurations are shown in Table 5.  Findings for these sub-
samples are consistent with the all-Africa sample, but the absolute and relative changes
differ.  For Francophone Africa, the greatest gain is found through a one-point increase in
Economic Freedom, while for Anglophone Africa, the greatest gain is through a one-
point decrease in the level of corruption.  These differences undoubtedly reflect a
combination of geography, historical experience, and institutional strengths and
weaknesses among the various countries.  As to the various economic community
groupings, the largest gain is in a reduction in corruption in the UDEAC group, followed
by a similar change for the COMESA group.  The largest losses are for an increase in
international aid in UDEAC, followed by a similar change for SADC.
Table 5
Effects of Economic and Institutional Reforms on Regional Groupings
Africa global French Africa English Africa COMESA Africa ECOWAS Africa SADC Africa UDEAC Africa
Number 30 17 13 11 10 9 5
Base PPPRPC GDP $1,617 $1,297 $2,453 $1,368 $1,316 $3,040 $1,587
Change in PPPRPCGDP of one-point change in:
AID Gross National Income Ratio +1 -$612 -$31 -$12 -$53 -$30 -$118 -$277
DebtService Ratio+1 -$70 -$5 -$1 -$5 -$2 -$35 $36
Trade Dependence to GDP Ratio+1 $16 $26 $2 $36 $26 $24 $16
Democracy+1 $19 $3 $11 $21 $4 $15 $11
FDI Ratio+1 $51 $30 $15 $37 $441 $40 $12
Market Capitalization Ratio+1 $53 $249 $13 $18 $249 $42 $53
Civil Liberties+1 $53 $6 $34 $46 $13 $45 $23
Political Rights+1 $72 $9 $43 $69 $17 $57 $35
GNS GDP Ratio+1 $142 $90 $46 $35 $90 $311 $142
Judicial Independence+1 $782 $117 $350 $475 $228 $565 $560
Economic Freedom+1 $790 $480 $359 $534 $439 $2,129 $3,074
RCRisk-1 $1,950 $101 $44 $70 $124 $364 $254
Corruption-1 $5,661 $170 $874 $3,496 $383 $1,569 $7,844
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Conclusion
Our risk-based model provides a methodology for examining the impact of
institutional reform on levels of per capita income.  We find that risk plays a major role in
explaining differences in income, and that it does so through differences in institutions.
Chief among these institutions are a country's level of judicial independence, the level of
property rights, along with the level of civil liberties political rights. However, while civil
liberties and political rights affect the level of democracy in a country, property rights
and judicial independence have a larger impact through their impact on economic
freedom.  A country's level of economic freedom has a greater impact than democracy on
the level of corruption, and in turn, on the level of aggregate country risk.  In this sense,
when countries engage in globalization, it is essential that the institutions of governance
be capable of handling the underlying level of risk.
Standard models of economic reform generally point to measures to increase a
country's rate of saving, its level of trade dependence, and efforts to increase the level of
market capitalization and foreign direct investment. While these variables explain
significant variations in per capita income, they depend in turn on the larger offects
produced by the level of risk.  Thus, policy reforms designed to raise per capita incomes
in Africa should first and foremost focus on measures to reduce aggregate country risk.
Since many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa do not have sovereign debt ratings and other
measures of risk, measures that create greater transparency in the operation of economic
and financial institutions represent an important first step in creating the conditions for











COMESA ECOWAS SADC UDEAC
Benin $1,053 53.0 F 1
Botswana $8,234 38.0 E 1
Burkina Faso $1,109 42.8 F 1
C.Af.Republic $1,028 41.8 F 1
Cameroon $2,001 48.0 F 1
Chad $1,143 48.3 F 1
Congo DR $658 45.2 F 1 1
Congo R $911 51.7 F 1
Côte d'Ivoire $1,395 45.1 F 1
Ethiopia $672 42.0 E 1
Gabon $6,045 53.0 F 1
Ghana $2,114 54.4 E 1
Guinea $1,981 46.2 F 1
Kenya $980 45.4 E 1
Madagascar $764 55.7 F 1
Malawi $571 37.5 E 1 1
Mali $939 40.6 F 1
Mauritania $1,668 51.0 F 1
Mauritius $10,664 72.3 E 1 1
Mozambique $1,055 40.7 P 1
Niger $789 46.4 F 1
Nigeria $992 44.9 E 1
Senegal $1,557 52.3 F 1
SouthAfrica $9,774 45.7 E 1
Sudan $1,805 58.6 E 1
Tanzania $587 42.7 E 1 1
Togo $1,603 49.7 F 1
Uganda $1,376 43.2 E 1
Zambia $828 36.5 E 1 1
Zimbabwe $840 38.5 E 1 1
Africa Sample $1,722 47.0
SSAfrica $1,613 41.0








Model Variable Statistics, Definitions, and Sources
B1. Variable Descriptive Statistics
AIDGNI CIVLIBS CORRUPA DEBTSRAT DEMOC ECFREE FDIGDP GNSGDP JUDIND
Mean 11.08 3.11 7.25 17.77 11.43 1.52 1.42 12.43 4.45
Median 9.59 3.00 7.35 15.55 6.00 1.60 0.58 11.30 4.45
Maximum 99.92 7.00 9.41 81.38 49.00 2.50 51.28 48.84 7.15
Minimum -0.29 1.00 2.30 0.28 1.00 0.20 -8.52 -23.75 1.15
Std. Dev. 10.01 1.42 0.92 12.22 11.27 0.43 3.37 9.63 1.19
Skewness 2.77 0.42 -0.86 1.26 1.31 -0.37 7.26 0.69 -0.21
Kurtosis 18.45 2.44 5.31 5.45 3.70 2.67 85.80 5.10 2.74
Jarque-Bera 8,421.89 31.41 258.56 385.39 231.03 20.82 220,830.00 197.05 7.77
Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Sum 8,307.22 2,336.11 5,434.03 13,328.53 8,572.05 1,139.55 1,065.17 9,322.07 3,334.03
Sum Sq. Dev. 75,101.54 1,509.24 640.77 111,881.00 95,215.88 136.60 8,492.30 69,398.26 1,056.80
Observations 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750
MILBURD MKTCAPRATE POLRTS PPPRPCGDP PROPRT RCCRISK REALINRATE TRDEP
Mean 2.41 11.77 2.97 1,852.01 2.60 46.20 4.65 60.57
Median 2.10 4.24 2.00 1,039.41 2.96 46.00 8.55 53.17
Maximum 11.45 199.91 7.00 10,995.54 4.00 77.00 57.43 148.92
Minimum 0.20 0.05 1.00 438.61 1.00 16.50 -98.15 6.32
Std. Dev. 1.63 26.90 1.78 2,094.89 0.65 10.44 17.44 27.54
Skewness 1.90 4.44 0.77 2.46 0.11 0.07 -2.08 0.91
Kurtosis 8.06 23.43 2.41 8.30 2.62 3.10 9.61 3.25
Jarque-Bera 1,250.89 15,503.63 85.37 1,636.62 6.01 0.91 1,907.82 105.84
Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.63 0.00 0.00
Sum 1,809.50 8,830.68 2,227.64 1,389,007.00 1,946.49 34,648.91 3,486.51 45,429.85
Sum Sq. Dev. 1,978.37 542,183.60 2,360.37 3,290,000.00 312.79 81,621.47 227,907.70 568,168.70
Observations 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750
B.2 Variable Definitions and Sources
Variable Definitions and Sources Source:
AIDGNI International Aid to Gross National Income Ratio 0.00 100.00 World Development Indicators, the World Bank
CIVLIBS Index of Civil Liberties 1.00 7.00 Freedom House
CORRUPA (1.) Revised Corruption Perceptions Index 0.00 10.00 Corruption Perceptions International
DEBTSRAT Debt Service Ratio 0.00 * World Development Indicators, the World Bank
DEMOC (2.) Index of Democracy 1.00 49.00 Freedom House
ECFREE Index of Economic Freedom 1.00 5.00 Heritage Foundation
FDIGDP Foreign Direct Investment to GDP Ratio 0.00 * World Development Indicators, the World Bank
GNSGDP Gross National Saving to GDP Ratio 0.00 * World Development Indicators, the World Bank
JUDIND Index of Judicial Independence 1.00 10.00 Heritage Foundation
MILBURD Military Expenditures to GDP Ratio 0.00 * World Development Indicators, the World Bank
MKTCAPRATE Market Capitalization to GDP Ratio 0.00 * Wordl Development Indicators, the World Bank
POLRTS Index of Political Rights 1.00 7.00 Freedom House
PPPRPCGDP Purchasing Power Parity Real Per Capita GDP 0.00 * World Development Indicators, the World Bank
PROPRT Index of Property Rights 1.00 5.00 Heritage Foundation
RCCRISK Revised International Country Aggregate Risk Index 1.00 100.00 ICRG, the World Bank
REALINRATE Real Interest Rate  - * * World Development Indicators, the World Bank
TRDEP Trade Dependency to GDP Ratio 0.00 * World Development Indicators, the World Bank
1. Computed as the inverse of the original CPI






PPPRPCGDP TRDEP FDIGDP DEMOC CORRUP
Global
Mean 7168.36 65.62 2.19 21.60 6.03
Median 4418.00 57.66 0.98 16.00 6.80
St.Dev. 7564.76 35.99 3.94 17.17 2.29
Obs. 2369 2369 2369 2369 2369
East and Southeast Asia
Mean 5389.47 64.99 2.08 18.13 6.80
Median 2768.00 53.06 0.69 16.00 7.35
St.Dev. 6030.24 47.52 3.07 12.94 1.93
Obs. 299 299 299 299 299
Central and Latin America
Mean 4792.71 54.57 2.01 27.26 6.15
Median 4489.00 49.58 1.12 30.00 6.89
St.Dev. 2103.72 26.80 2.56 12.12 2.01
Obs. 391 391 391 391 391
East Europe
Mean 7828.63 83.73 2.48 19.59 6.40
Median 8083.00 77.72 1.80 16.00 6.49
St.Dev. 2521.49 35.75 2.81 16.41 1.12
Obs. 253 253 253 253 253
West Europe
Mean 19951.80 80.69 5.16 46.09 2.63
Median 19594.00 67.14 2.72 49.00 2.35
St.Dev. 6007.65 45.63 7.54 4.27 1.65
Obs. 391 391 391 391 391
North Africa and the Middle East
Mean 4299.24 63.60 1.33 6.89 7.29
Median 3951.00 60.26 0.91 6.00 7.38
St.Dev. 2446.20 22.65 1.78 5.29 1.15
Obs. 276 276 276 276 276
Sub-Saharan Africa
Mean 1825.12 60.15 0.96 10.89 7.25
Median 1042.50 52.54 0.47 6.00 7.34
St.Dev. 2053.19 27.74 1.52 10.96 0.91
Obs. 690 690 690 690 690
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1 Research support from the MSU Faculty Scholarship Program and data compilation by
MSU graduate students Nahid Nipa, Maria Slaba and Erna Stummer is gratefully
acknowledged,.
2 Using the World Development Indicators database of the World Bank, Sub-Saharan
African countries were, on average for the 1990-2005 period, at least thirty percent more
open to international trade and investment than for the world group of countries as a
whole.  The only areas with greater openness were the East Asia and Pacific countries,
and countries in the Middle East and North Africa.  Yet during the same time period, East
Asian and Pacific countries grew at just under seven percent per year.  One result is that
Sub-Saharan Africa's share of world exports has fallen, even as absolute export levels
have grown.
3 Some of this discussion has turned on the Washington Consensus of reform, in which
privatization and free trade form the focus of reform efforts by the IMF and the World
Bank, among other institutions.  Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco (2004) provide a critical
evaluation of the Washington Consensus, and suggest that the sequence of reforms counts
as much as their magnitude.
4 http://www.cpi.de
5 The index of economic freedom estimated by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall
Street Journal provides a quantitative index that can be linked to democracy, risk, and
other determinants of economic growth.
6 At an aggregate level, country risk reflects not just financial risk, but also economic,
political, and environmental risk.  In this paper, we will focus on an aggregate country
measure of risk to examine the role of institutional reform.
7 Terrorism  represents a variant of political risk and which has spawned a literature of its
own.  See, for example, Todd Sandler and Walter Enders (2005), The Political Economy
of Terrorism.  (New York:  Cambridge University Press).
8 The ICRG aggregate country risk index is scaled between 0 and 100, with higher values
representing lower risk.  We invert this scale to demonstrate the inverse relationship
between the level of risk and per capita GDP.  To distinguish our inverted scale we use
RCCRISK rather than CCRISK.
9 In separate regressions not reported here, we find that aid has no statistically significant
effects on political rights, a slight positive effect on civil liberties, a slight negative effect
on corruption, and no statistically significant effects on either economic freedom or
market capitalization.
10 As noted earlier, this is not an argument against the expansion of civil liberties,
political rights, or democracy, but rather that these institutions produce smaller gains in
per capita income than an expansion of economic freedom.
11 Data limitations restricted our country sample.  COMESA countries not included in our
estimates are:  Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Namibia, Rwanda,
Seychelles, and Swaziland.  ECOWAS countries not included are:  Cape Verde, Gambia,
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone.  SADC countries not included are:
Angola, Lesotho, Namibia, Seychelles, and Swaziland.  UDEAC countries not included
are: Equatorial Guinea.
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